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Abstract: This study explores a possible risk of overseas investment in long cross-national distance
host countries using the foreign direct investment (FDI) data in Japan. We expect that increasing
cross-national distance would relate to the less sustainable tax policies by increasing the differences in
economic, political, administrative, cultural, demographic, knowledge, and geographic perspectives,
which enhance the motivation of tax aggressiveness and the likelihood of earnings management.
Consistent with our expectations, we find that firms with longer cross-national distance are less likely
to adopt sustainable tax policies. After some robust tests, our main findings remain unchanged.
In additional analysis, we find the above relation is weakened when firms invest in a tax-haven
country or have a high proportion of foreign ownership, while it is strengthened when firms meet
an earnings benchmark. Overall, our results suggest the one risk of increasing cross-national distance
between host country and home country is less sustainable tax policies.
Keywords: cross-national distance; sustainable tax policy; foreign direct investment
1. Introduction
Many taxation studies discuss the outcomes of book-tax difference, a proxy to represent the
tax aggressive policy, from several aspects [1–6]. We define that sustainable tax policies focus on
maintaining less difference between book income and taxable income over time. Sustainable tax policies
are essential for the long-term business sustainability, especially for the multinational firms that engage
more complicate business activities, like foreign direct investment (FDI). However, few studies pay
attention to the relationship between sustainable tax policies and cross-national distance of FDI. In this
study, we are motivated to explore the empirical association between country-level characteristics and
sustainable tax policies from cross-national distances perspectives.
Based on the theory of tax competition, local governments create a comparative advantage to
attract FDI by making tax policy more attractive to foreign companies. Chan and Mo [7] find the
export-oriented firms have significantly greater book-tax-conforming audit adjustments due to the
reason that those firms have more opportunities and incentives for tax noncompliance. In addition,
the level of economic, political and reginal diffusion has effect on the tax policy change. Omer and
Shelley [8] find that due to the geographic isolation and difference economic features some states can
remain stable when other states change their tax policy. Thus, we can assume that, for the country
level, two countries with great difference in some country characteristics (e.g., economic, political,
cultural, knowledge, and geographic, etc.) may lead to more opportunities for firms to make the
trade-off between the high book income and low tax expense. Accordingly, we expect that increasing
cross-national distance between host countries and home country can lead to less sustainable tax
policies by increasing the difference in country characters, which enhance the motivation of tax
aggrievances and earnings management opportunities.
The existing literature demonstrates that the extent as well as the consistency of book-tax difference
has important effects on the business outcomes. In this study, we apply a dummy variable to represent
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the adoption of a sustainable tax policy. Sustainable tax policy refers to the case where the firm has
a low level of book-tax difference as well as a low level of standard deviation of book-tax difference
for the three-year period. Along with prior studies [9,10] book-tax difference is measured as pre-tax
accounting income less taxable income, scaled by lagged total assets.
Considering that different portfolios of FDI may represent different cross-country distance,
we obtain foreign investment details of all listed firms in Japan from Toyo Keizai’s Overseas Japanese
Companies database—by County (hereafter referred to as “OJC database”). In addition, we use
Mahalanobis distance to calculate cross-national distances between Japan and host countries. Based on
the international business literature [11,12], this study discusses cross-national distance with seven
multidimensional measures. We estimate that the greater the cross-national distances between host
countries and home country, the less likely it has a sustainable tax policy.
The Japanese data set provides an ideal opportunity to measure the cross-national distance
of FDI for a firm-year level. We can access the information on how many and what countries are
invested by each firm and by each year from the OJC database. Based on the World Factbook of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), World Development Indicators (WDI), World Trade Organization
(WTO), Political Constraint Index (POLCON), La Porta et al. [13], Hofstede et al. [14], United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and Scientific Journal Rankings (SJR), we gather country level
component variables from the economic, political, administrative, cultural, demographic, knowledge,
and geographical perspectives. By doing so, we could analyze cross-national distance effects on the
sustainability of tax policies based on a firm-year level data set.
Using 9036 firm-years sample data from year 2006 to 2014, the archival evidence shows that
firms with longer cross-national distances (from the economic, political, administrative, cultural,
demographic, knowledge, and geographical perspectives) between parent and host countries exhibit
less sustainable tax policies. A further robust test shows that our findings of hypothesis still hold
based on the subsample with the FDI sample only. Moreover, considering the potential problem of
self-selection bias, we adopt a two-stage Heckman model to mitigate the endogeneity issue and the
results remain unchanged. Our findings suggest that country characteristics affect tax practices.
We also provide some additional tests for interest. First, we examine whether tax avoidance
incentive affects sustainable tax policies in multinationals. We find FDI in a tax haven country causes
a decreasing effect on the relation between cross-national distances and sustainable tax policies,
which indicates that a tax haven country investment may be substituted in terms of factors contributing
to less sustainable tax policies. Second, we further investigate the impact of earnings management
incentive on the effects of cross-national distances and sustainable tax policies. We find that meeting
an earnings benchmark (represented as a high possibility of engaging earnings management) has
a positive moderate effect on the relationship between cross-national distance and the sustainable tax
policies. Third, we try to explore whether different ownership structures affect our results. We find
that foreigner investors’ interests (characteristic with a high proportion of foreign ownership) have
a negative moderate effect on our main results. The findings of this study contribute to the literature
and business practice by exploring how cross-national distances affect the likelihood of the adoption
for sustainable tax policies.
The remaining parts of this paper are as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature review and
hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the empirical methods about regression models and
sample selection. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and correlations of the sample, explains
the multivariate results, and describes some robustness tests on the main results. Section 5 discusses
further analysis. Section 6 provides conclusions and discussion.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Prior studies test the relationship between tax incentive and location decision of overseas
investment. Most of this research mentions that host countries’ tax rates affect firms’ location decision,
and a lower tax rate is associated with more investment [15–17]. However, few research discusses
Sustainability 2019, 11, 2639 3 of 22
whether and how country characteristic, as the cross-country distance between host countries and
home country, could reflect the sustainable tax policies. This study adds to a stream of research
providing evidence of a potential risk of less sustainable tax policies when increasing the cross-national
distance of FDI.
2.1. Book-Tax Difference and Sustainable Tax Policies
Blaylock et al. [18] summarizes three possible reasons that lead to greater book-tax differences.
That is tax-planning strategy, deferred tax expense, and earnings management. It means different
characteristics of book-tax differences can reflect different tax policies.
Prior studies attribute the findings to book-tax difference having a negative effect on the
reporting quality in the long run. A high level of book-tax difference implicates a less persistent
earnings performance as well as a poor expectation of future earnings persistence [19]. Moreover,
Comprix et al. [20] argue that great book-tax differences implicate an aggressive financial accounting
and tax reporting practice based on the archival evidence. Besides, book-tax differences also regarded
as a measure of compliance risk [21,22]. Specifically, Mills [22] shows that there exists a positive
relationship between book-tax differences and audit adjustments, since auditors spent more effort
making a balance on tax saving, costs of tax examination, and audit quality when firms had greater
book-tax differences. In the tax avoidance literature, book-tax difference is used as a proxy to represent
tax avoidance activity. Based on prior studies, higher value of book-tax difference reflects an increased
level of tax avoidance [9,10,23,24].
In addition, existing literatures also suggest that the change of book-tax differences is related with
firm performance, financial distress, and default risk [25,26]. Ayers et al [25] investigate the relation
between changes in book-tax differences and credit rating changes. They suppose that credit ratings
agencies may use large changes in book-tax differences as indicators for decreased earnings quality
or increased off-balance-sheet financing. The results support their hypotheses and suggest that large
changes in book-tax differences (both positive and negative) are negatively related with favorable rating
changes. Noga and Schnader [26] demonstrate that large abnormal changes in book-tax difference can
be utilized as an indicator of high risk for bankruptcy. They find firms with larger changes in book-tax
difference compared to their counterparts have an increased likelihood of experiencing bankruptcy in
the coming five-year period.
Considering both extent and consistency of book-tax difference have important effects on the
business sustainability, in this study, we define that sustainable tax policies focus on maintaining a low
level of differences between book income and taxable income over time. Consistent low book-tax
difference enables firms to become more sustainable and less uncertain. However, less sustainable tax
policies bear some negative effects on reporting quality, auditing adjustments, as well as tax practice.
It will be helpful to investigate what and how cross-national distances of FDI affect the likelihood of
adopting a sustainable tax policy.
2.2. Cross-National Distance of FDI and Sustainable Tax Policies
Based on the tax competition theory, governments attract foreign direct investment through
changing the tax policy (e.g., mining tax rate, offer special tax preferences, etc.), which creates
a comparative advantage. Some policies encourage local firms to engage foreign direct investment by
offering some taxational benefits or supports [7]. Thus, firms engaging foreign direct investment have
more opportunities and incentive for book tax noncompliance.
Additionally, Buettner and Ruf [16] show that location decisions of FDI are affected by the tax
incentives, market size, and labor cost. In other words, the different host countries decisions may
reflect different levels of tax incentives and strategies. Furthermore, Omer and Shelley [8] show the
evidence from the state level that tax policy affected by the level of economic, political and regional
diffusion. Similarly, from the country level perspective, we expect that those firms who invest in host
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countries with greater cross-national distance to home county are more likely to have a different or
unique tax environment, they may have more opportunities to engage tax manipulative practices.
Considering these prior studies, we expect that increasing cross-national distance between host
countries and home country can threaten the sustainability of tax policies by increasing the difference in
economic, political, administrative, cultural, demographic, knowledge, and geographical perspectives,
which enhance the motivation of tax aggressiveness and the likelihood of earnings management.
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, firms with greater cross-national distances between host countries and home
country are less likely to adopt sustainable tax policies.
3. Empirical Method
3.1. Regression Model
Following prior studies, we use the following regression model to test our hypothesis:
STP = a0 + a1MDIS + a2FOREIGN + a3CASH + a4INTANG + a5LEV + a6RD
+a7EQLNE + a8NOL + a9LOSSINT + a10CFO + a11SIZE + a12DISC + a13THAV
+a14EM + a15EMP + a16SALE + a17INVINT + a18TAGG + Yd + Id + ε
(1)
where all variables are defined in Table 1. The dependent variable (STP) is measured as a dummy
variable that equals 1 if a firm has a sustainable tax policy, and 0 otherwise. Sustainable tax policy
refers to the case where the firm has a low level of BTAX as well as a low level of standard deviation of
BTAX for the three-year period (both lower than the median). BTAX is pre-tax accounting income less
taxable income (where taxable income is computed as income tax expense divided by the statutory
corporate tax rate) divided by lagged total assets. Taxable income is computed as tax expense divided
by the corporate statutory tax rate [9,10].
To examine our hypothesis, we analyze the coefficient on MDIS. MDIS represents the sum of
administrative distances (ADM), cultural distances (CUL), demographic distances (DEM), economic
distances (ECO), geographical distances (GEO), knowledge distances (KNO), and political distances
(POL) between Japan and host countries, respectively. We expect a positive association between MDIS
and STP.
Besides geographical distance, we use multiple dimensions to represent other types of
cross-national distances. For the international business studies, many researchers shed light on the value
of Mahalanobis distance calculation method for calculating the cross-national distance [11,12,27,28].
Considering the advantages of Mahalanobis method, we use it to calculate each type of cross-national
distance between Japan and host countries. The formula of Mahalanobis distance between Japan and
each host country is calculated as follow:
d(a, b) =
√
(a− b)C−1(a− b)T (2)
where, for each type of cross-national distance, a and b represent a vector for n distance dimensions
of Japan and host country respectively; C is a n-by-n covariance matrix with element Cij equal to the
sample covariance of indicator i and j in the country-indicator matrix of the given year. The definitions
about dimensions of each type of cross-national distance are provided in Appendix A, Table A1.
We control for other determinants of firms’ tax positions by including variables that are common
in the prior studies that capture profitability (NOL, LOSSINT, and EQLNE), and opportunities (SIZE,
LEV, RD, and INTANG) to engage in tax issues [9,10,24,29–36]. Meanwhile, we include variables
(CASH and CFO) to control for liquidity that could potentially affect tax measure [24,34].
Also, we control for the geographic earnings disclosure (DISC) because Hope et al. [32]
mention that a firm opting to discontinue disclosure of geographic earrings in their financial
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reports has lower worldwide effective tax rates. Furthermore, we consider the tax haven utilization
(THAV) because several researchers argue that tax haven utilization is significantly associated with
tax avoidance [10,37,38]. In addition, we control for the incentives to manage earnings (EM) as
Frank et al. [30] use in their research. Besides, we create five variables to capture foreign investors’
interests (FOREIGN) [39], the number of employees (EMP) [31], growth opportunity (∆SALE) [24],
inventory intensity (INVINT) [10], and tax aggressive (TAGG) [40,41]. Finally, we include industry
dummy and year dummy because prior study considers that tax practice varies by industry and
by year.
Table 1. Definitions and measurements of the variables.
Variables Definitions
Dependent variables
STP
A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has a sustainable tax policy, and 0 otherwise. Sustainable tax policy refers to the
case where the firm has a low level of BTAX as well as a low level of standard deviation of BTAX for the three-year period
(both lower than the median). Where BTAX is pre-tax accounting income less taxable income (where taxable income is
computed as income tax expense divided by the statutory corporate tax rate) divided by lagged total assets;
Test variables
ADM Sum of the administrative distances (Mahalanobis distances) between Japan and host countries;
CUL Sum of the cultural distances (Mahalanobis distances) between Japan and host countries;
DEM Sum of the demographic distances (Mahalanobis distances) between Japan and host countries;
ECO Sum of the economic distances (Mahalanobis distances) between Japan and host countries;
GEO Sum of the total great circle distances, in 1000 km, between Japan and host countries according to the coordinates of thegeographic center of the countries;
KNO Sum of the knowledge distances (Mahalanobis distances) between Japan and host countries;
POL Sum of the political distances (Mahalanobis distances) between Japan and host countries;
Control variables
4SALE Changes in sales/lagged net sales;
CASH Cash and marketable securities/lagged total assets;
CFO Cash flow from operations/lagged total assets;
DISC A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm disclose geographic overseas sales, and 0 otherwise;
EM A dummy variable that equal 1 if the change in net income from year t–1 to year t/the market value at year t–2, is greaterthan 0 and less than or equal to 0.01, and 0 otherwise;
EMP The natural logarithm of the number of employees;
EQLNE Equity income/lagged total assets;
FOREIGN A dummy variable that equals 1 if the proportion of a firm’s foreign ownership is highest, and 0 otherwise;
INTANG Intangible asset/lagged total assets;
INVINT Inventory/lagged total assets;
LEV Total debt/lagged total assets;
LOSSINT Loss intensity over the previous four-year period defined as the number of years a firm has negative pre-tax income fromyear t–4 to year t–1 scaled to range between 0 and 1;
NOL A dummy variable that equals 1 if loss carry-forward is negative at the beginning of year, and 0 otherwise;
RD Research and development expense/lagged total assets;
SIZE Natural logarithm of the total assets;
TAGG
A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is tax aggressive, and 0 otherwise. Tax aggressiveness is defined as a firm with
either a CAS_ETR or CUR_ETR in the lowest quintile by year and industry membership. Where CAS_ETR is cash effective
tax rate of the six-year sum of cash taxes paid to the six-year sum of pre-tax book income. CUR_ETR is current effective tax
rate of the six-year sum of current tax expense to the six-year sum of pre-tax book income. CAS_ETR and CUR_ETR are
truncated to the range (0,1);
THAV A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has at least one subsidiary firm incorporated in a tax haven, and 0 otherwise;
Id Industry dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is represented in the specific TSE New Industry Code category,and 0 otherwise;
Yd Year dummy variable that equals 1 if the year falls within the specific year category, and 0 otherwise;
Variables added in robust tests
ADV Advertisement expenditure/net sales;
CAP Ownership equity/lagged total assets;
INTEREST Interest expense/total debt;
QUICTR Liquid assets/current liabilities;
ROA Net income/lagged total assets.
3.2. Sample Selection
Table 2 presents information on the sample selection process. For estimating the regression model,
we used firm-year data from fiscal year 2006 to 2014. Information about taxation data and financial
data was obtained from the Nikkei Economic Electronic Database System (NEEDS) Financial Quest
database. Information about Japanese firms’ overseas investment was obtained from the OJC database.
After restricting our sample to firms with fiscal year ended as of March 31, and excluding financial
companies and missing data, our full available sample consisted of 9036 firm-years.
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Table 2. Sample selection process.
Listed companies for fiscal years 2006 to 2014 16,993 *
(less) Banks and financial institutions −1013
(less) Taxation data unavailable −5340 **
(less) Financial data unavailable −1604
Full available sample 9036
* Data from NEEDS Database using the criteria: Accounting year-end at the end of March. ** According to prior
research, we truncate the cash effective tax rate (CAS_ETR) and the current effective tax rate (CUR_ETR) to the
range (0,1).
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics. For the dependent variables, the mean value of STP in
the full sample was 0.302. For the test variables, the mean value of ECO, POL, ADM, CUL, DEM, KNO,
and GEO was 44.09, 23.06, 79.18, 75.68, 53.86, 113.80, and 28.14, respectively. Table 3 also compares
the mean differences between the subsample of the FDI group and non-FDI group, using t-tests.
In general, companies engaging in FDI activities were more likely to adopt less sustainable tax policies
(i.e., low value of STP).
Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
Full Sample (n = 9036) FDI (n = 6295)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 0 1 diff. t-Statistic
STP 0.302 0.459 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.381 0.267 0.114 10.944 ***
ECO 44.091 59.518 0.000 15.076 71.450 0.000 63.289 −63.289 −53.263 ***
POL 23.057 33.246 0.000 9.852 33.998 0.000 33.097 −33.097 −48.924 ***
ADM 79.182 118.275 0.000 30.709 111.922 0.000 113.660 −113.660 −46.806 ***
CUL 75.683 101.517 0.000 38.109 109.000 0.000 108.638 −108.638 −53.710 ***
DEM 53.861 72.695 0.000 28.445 78.957 0.000 77.314 −77.314 −53.274 ***
KNO 113.796 180.270 0.000 45.140 147.796 0.000 163.346 −163.346 −43.552 ***
GEO 28.144 45.302 0.000 11.075 36.916 0.000 40.399 −40.399 −42.722 ***
FOREIGN 0.043 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.051 −0.026 −5.650 ***
CASH 0.303 0.157 0.202 0.279 0.374 0.290 0.308 −0.018 −5.101 ***
INTANG 0.024 0.048 0.004 0.010 0.023 0.021 0.025 −0.004 −4.070 ***
LEV 0.512 0.206 0.361 0.511 0.655 0.540 0.500 0.040 8.459 ***
RD 0.016 0.025 0.000 0.006 0.022 0.007 0.019 −0.012 −21.647 ***
EQLNE 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 −0.001 −8.332 ***
NOL 0.050 0.218 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.050 −0.001 −0.190
LOSSINT 0.125 0.201 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.127 0.124 0.003 0.714
CFO 0.067 0.059 0.038 0.065 0.094 0.063 0.068 −0.005 −3.883 ***
MV 4.920 0.615 4.493 4.842 5.289 4.700 5.015 −0.316 −23.106 ***
DISC 0.460 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.084 0.623 −0.539 −54.452 ***
THAV 0.179 0.383 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.248 −0.231 −27.378 ***
EM 0.165 0.371 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.177 0.160 0.017 2.040 **
EMP 3.271 0.603 2.846 3.214 3.655 2.993 3.392 −0.399 −30.372 ***
4SALE 0.044 0.183 −0.014 0.034 0.094 0.039 0.046 −0.007 −1.590
INVINT 0.118 0.098 0.052 0.105 0.158 0.107 0.123 −0.016 −7.222 ***
TAGG 0.359 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.354 0.362 −0.008 −0.732
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
Table 4 presents the pairwise Pearson (lower) and Spearman (upper) correlations. Based on the
results of Pearson and Spearman correlations, STP was negatively associated with independent variable
ECO, POL, ADM, CUL, DEM, KNO, and GEO, respectively. In general, the results of the correlation
tests do not show excessively strong correlations between variables. Considering some correlations
exceed 0.5, we checked for multicollinearity by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF). We found
that all the values were less than 6.1, and the average VIF of the variables (without intercept) was less
than 1.82 for each regression test.
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Table 4. Correlation coefficients between variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1. STP −0.12 −0.13 −0.13 −0.14 −0.13 −0.13 −0.14 −0.05 −0.29 −0.11 0.27 −0.20 0.00 0.09 0.13 −0.32 0.05 −0.16 −0.05 0.05 −0.01 −0.15 −0.03 0.04
2. ECO −0.08 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.93 0.91 0.11 0.10 0.14 −0.04 0.37 0.26 0.00 −0.01 0.07 0.39 0.61 0.38 −0.01 0.47 0.09 0.20 0.01
3. POL −0.10 0.85 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.12 0.09 0.17 −0.04 0.42 0.26 0.00 −0.01 0.10 0.41 0.62 0.31 0.00 0.50 0.07 0.21 0.00
4. ADM −0.09 0.88 0.92 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.12 0.11 0.17 −0.03 0.43 0.29 0.00 −0.01 0.10 0.44 0.65 0.34 −0.01 0.53 0.08 0.22 0.01
5. CUL −0.11 0.89 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.12 0.11 0.17 −0.04 0.44 0.29 0.00 −0.02 0.10 0.45 0.66 0.34 −0.01 0.54 0.08 0.23 0.01
6. DEM −0.09 0.91 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.12 0.11 0.15 −0.04 0.41 0.28 −0.01 −0.02 0.09 0.42 0.64 0.34 −0.02 0.51 0.08 0.22 0.00
7. KNO −0.09 0.78 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.88 0.96 0.11 0.09 0.16 −0.04 0.43 0.28 −0.01 −0.02 0.09 0.43 0.63 0.34 −0.01 0.51 0.07 0.22 0.00
8. GEO −0.10 0.81 0.90 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.93 0.11 0.12 0.18 −0.04 0.46 0.29 0.00 −0.02 0.11 0.46 0.67 0.33 −0.01 0.54 0.08 0.24 0.01
9. FOREIGN −0.05 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.04 −0.08 0.08 0.05 0.00 −0.06 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.01
10. CASH −0.26 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.07 −0.44 0.16 0.07 −0.06 −0.07 0.48 −0.08 0.10 0.02 0.04 −0.04 0.08 −0.21 −0.02
11. INTANG −0.11 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.06 −0.03 −0.05 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.32 0.11 −0.05 −0.04
12. LEV 0.25 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 −0.08 −0.36 0.07 −0.24 0.08 0.09 0.20 −0.19 0.17 −0.08 0.02 −0.08 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.11
13. RD −0.17 0.19 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.06 0.12 0.13 −0.18 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.14 0.49 0.15 −0.02 0.26 0.00 0.31 0.00
14. EQLNE −0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.01 −0.02 0.00 −0.02 −0.03 0.02 0.33 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.30 0.02 −0.02 0.08
15. NOL 0.09 −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.06 −0.02 0.08 0.01 −0.01 0.06 −0.06 −0.03 0.02 −0.01 −0.10 −0.01 −0.08 0.03 0.12
16. LOSSINT 0.12 −0.02 −0.05 −0.03 −0.04 −0.03 −0.04 −0.03 −0.05 −0.04 −0.02 0.17 0.00 −0.01 0.05 −0.11 −0.14 0.04 −0.01 −0.09 −0.11 0.04 0.13 0.19
17. CFO −0.25 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.58 0.20 −0.18 0.12 0.05 −0.05 −0.07 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.11 −0.14 0.00
18. MV 0.07 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.07 −0.10 0.12 0.18 0.10 0.11 −0.03 −0.16 0.04 0.23 0.12 0.07 0.84 0.02 0.07 −0.01
19. DISC −0.16 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.52 0.47 0.49 0.09 0.06 0.03 −0.08 0.35 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.22 0.25 −0.04 0.29 0.07 0.31 0.04
20. THAV −0.05 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.07 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.13 0.25 −0.02 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.03
21. EM 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.04 −0.08 0.00 −0.02 −0.10 −0.08 0.05 0.07 −0.04 −0.02 0.05 0.03 −0.06 −0.04
22. EMP 0.00 0.50 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.09 −0.06 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.08 −0.01 −0.11 0.12 0.85 0.30 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.06 −0.03
23. 4SALE −0.08 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.12 0.26 0.05 0.03 −0.06 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.01
24. INVINT −0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.01 −0.24 −0.06 0.23 0.13 −0.03 0.02 0.09 −0.27 0.02 0.18 0.05 −0.06 −0.02 0.15 0.07
25. TAGG 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.03 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.02 −0.01 0.04 0.03 −0.04 −0.03 0.02 0.05
Correlations are based on 9036 firm-year observations. Pearson (Spearman) correlations in the lower (upper) diagonal. Correlation coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the
10 percent level.
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4.2. Multivariate Results
Table 5 presents the logit regression results for seven different types of cross-national distance that
affect sustainability of tax policies. In all alternative cross-national distances of Table 5, the coefficients
of the cross-national distance (i.e., ECO, POL, ADM, CUL, DEM, KNO, and GEO) were significant
and negative.
For the results of Equation (A), the coefficient on ECO had a value of −0.0016 and was significant
at the 95% level. This shows that firms with greater economic distances between host countries and
home country are more likely to adopt less sustainable tax policies. This effect was economically
significant—a one standard deviation increase in economic distances led to an 8.8 percent decrease
(odds ratio is eˆ (−0.0016×59.518)–1) in the likelihood of adopting sustainable tax policies. For the results
of Equation (B), the coefficient on POL had a value of −0.0038 and was significant at the 99% level.
This shows that firms with greater political distances between host countries and home country are more
likely to adopt less sustainable tax policies. This effect was economically significant—a one standard
deviation increase in political distances led to an 11.8 percent decrease (odds ratio is eˆ (−0.0038×33.246)–1)
in the likelihood of adopting sustainable tax policies. For the results of Equation (C), the coefficient
on ADM had a value of −0.0008 and was significant at the 95% level. This shows that firms with
greater administrative distances between host countries and home country are more likely to adopt less
sustainable tax policies. This effect was economically significant—a one standard deviation increase
in administrative distances led to an 9.4 percent decrease (odds ratio is eˆ (−0.0008×118.275)–1) in the
likelihood of adopting sustainable tax policies.
For the results of Equation (D), the coefficient on CUL had a value of −0.0013 and was significant
at the 99% level. This shows that firms with greater cultural distances between host countries and
home country are more likely to adopt less sustainable tax policies. This effect was economically
significant—a one standard deviation increase in cultural distances led to a 12.1 percent decrease
(odds ratio is eˆ (−0.0013×101.517)–1) in the likelihood of adopting sustainable tax policies. For the results
of Equation (E), the coefficient on DEM had a value of −0.0013 and was significant at the 95% level.
This shows that firms with greater demographical distances between host countries and home country
are more likely to adopt less sustainable tax policies. This effect was economically significant—a one
standard deviation increase in demographical distances led to an 9.0 percent decrease (odds ratio is
eˆ (−0.0013×72.695)–1) in the likelihood of adopting sustainable tax policies. For the results of Equation (F),
the coefficient on KNO had a value of −0.0005 and was significant at the 95% level. This shows that
firms with greater knowledge distances between host countries and home country are more likely to
adopt less sustainable tax policies. This effect was economically significant—a one standard deviation
increase in knowledge distances led to an 9.0 percent decrease (odds ratio is eˆ (−0.0005×180.270)–1) in
the likelihood of adopting sustainable tax policies. For the results of Equation (G), the coefficient
on GEO had a value of −0.0016 and was significant at the 90% level. This shows that firms with
greater geographical distances between host countries and home country are more likely to adopt less
sustainable tax policies. This effect was economically significant—a one standard deviation increase in
geographical distances led to a 6.9 percent decrease (odds ratio is eˆ (−0.0016×45.302)–1) in the likelihood
of adopting sustainable tax policies.
Overall, all seven results abovementioned support our hypothesis from both statistical and
economic sense, which indicates that firms with longer cross-national distances (from the economic,
political, administrative, cultural, demographic, knowledge, and geographical perspectives) between
parent and host countries exhibit less sustainable tax policies.
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Table 5. Cross-national distance and sustainable tax policies.
Dependent Variable as STP
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
ECO POL ADM CUL DEM KNO GEO
Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic
Test variables
MDIS −0.0016 −2.45 ** −0.0038 −3.24 *** −0.0008 −2.48 ** −0.0013 −3.08 *** −0.0013 −2.45 ** −0.0005 −2.39 ** −0.0016 −1.79 *
Control variables
FOREIGN −0.0573 −0.38 −0.0447 −0.30 −0.0483 −0.32 −0.0439 −0.29 −0.0507 −0.34 −0.0533 −0.36 −0.0585 −0.39
CASH −2.0592 −7.22 *** −2.0521 −7.20 *** −2.0453 −7.16 *** −2.0364 −7.14 *** −2.0548 −7.20 *** −2.0588 −7.21 *** −2.0616 −7.21 ***
INTANG −4.5300 −4.88 *** −4.4255 −4.78 *** −4.4639 −4.82 *** −4.3716 −4.72 *** −4.5265 −4.89 *** −4.4617 −4.81 *** −4.4809 −4.81 ***
LEV 1.9775 11.66 *** 1.9993 11.78 *** 1.9981 11.77 *** 1.9900 11.73 *** 1.9917 11.74 *** 1.9937 11.75 *** 1.9938 11.75 ***
RD −5.9017 −2.61 *** −5.4513 −2.42 ** −5.4611 −2.42 ** −5.3101 −2.36 ** −5.6412 −2.50 ** −5.3988 −2.39 ** −5.4092 −2.39 **
EQLNE −37.7528 −3.78 *** −36.5221 −3.68 *** −36.9489 −3.71 *** −36.7507 −3.70 *** −36.8856 −3.71 *** −37.0901 −3.73 *** −37.2339 −3.73 ***
NOL 0.8179 7.06 *** 0.8189 7.07 *** 0.8183 7.07 *** 0.8189 7.07 *** 0.8155 7.05 *** 0.8182 7.07 *** 0.8202 7.09 ***
LOSSINT 1.4772 10.54 *** 1.4738 10.52 *** 1.4793 10.56 *** 1.4816 10.57 *** 1.4763 10.54 *** 1.4754 10.54 *** 1.4793 10.56 ***
CFO −7.9952 −11.35 *** −8.0010 −11.37 *** −8.0012 −11.36 *** −8.0139 −11.38 *** −8.0011 −11.36 *** −7.9866 −11.34 *** −7.9573 −11.31 ***
MV 0.6391 6.22 *** 0.6447 6.27 *** 0.6476 6.30 *** 0.6543 6.36 *** 0.6437 6.26 *** 0.6481 6.30 *** 0.6510 6.32 ***
DISC −0.3043 −4.13 *** −0.2925 −4.02 *** −0.3114 −4.29 *** −0.2871 −3.89 *** −0.3080 −4.21 *** −0.3179 −4.41 *** −0.3319 −4.62 ***
THAV 0.0036 0.05 −0.0048 −0.06 −0.0116 −0.16 −0.0024 −0.03 −0.0073 −0.10 −0.0126 −0.17 −0.0183 −0.24
EM 0.5922 8.21 *** 0.5925 8.21 *** 0.5908 8.19 *** 0.5919 8.20 *** 0.5907 8.19 *** 0.5917 8.20 *** 0.5902 8.18 ***
EMP −0.2888 −2.58 ** −0.2679 −2.39 ** −0.2860 −2.55 ** −0.2689 −2.40 ** −0.2872 −2.56 ** −0.2947 −2.64 *** −0.3122 −2.81 ***
4SALE −1.5661 −7.82 *** −1.5858 −7.91 *** −1.5789 −7.88 *** −1.5825 −7.90 *** −1.5748 −7.87 *** −1.5873 −7.92 *** −1.5820 −7.90 ***
INVINT −2.9199 −8.42 *** −2.9278 −8.44 *** −2.9156 −8.41 *** −2.9079 −8.38 *** −2.9202 −8.42 *** −2.9100 −8.39 *** −2.9077 −8.39 ***
TAGG 0.0323 0.56 0.0312 0.54 0.0311 0.54 0.0304 0.52 0.0310 0.54 0.0304 0.53 0.0306 0.53
Yd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Id Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept −2.5807 −7.99 *** −2.6741 −8.22 *** −2.6482 −8.03 *** −2.7202 −8.22 *** −2.6213 −8.02 *** −2.6271 −8.00 *** −2.5828 −7.81 ***
Pseudo R2 0.2110 0.2114 0.2110 0.2113 0.2110 0.2110 0.2107
No. Obs. 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
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4.3. Robustness Checks
4.3.1. Subsample Analysis
In case our main results are driven by the difference between FDI and non-FDI firms, we dropped
the non-FDI sample and then ran the regression models within the FDI sample (6295 firm-year
observations) only. Table 6 presents regression results on the independent variables (i.e., ECO, POL,
ADM, CUL, DEM, KNO, and GEO) with the FDI sample only. The coefficients of ECO, POL, ADM,
CUL, DEM, KNO, and GEO are consistent with our main findings. This suggests that the relations
documented in our main tests also exist in a continuous patter within multinationals with FDIs.
In other words, our findings of hypothesis not only exist between firms operating domestically and
those expanding overseas, but also hold among multinational investing across different countries.
Multinationals investing in long cross-national distance countries display less sustainable tax policies
than those investing in short cross-national distance countries.
4.3.2. Endogeneity
Furthermore, it is possible that our results are driven by the self-selection of multinationals.
For example, firms expanding overseas may be genetically of higher quality. Firms who choose to
invest overseas are those with less financial constraints, higher market demand, and more optimal
corporate strategies, etc. Given the possibility that firms who engage in FDI may be inherently different
from their counterparts (i.e., firms who do not engage in FDI), we used Heckman’s two-stage approach.
At the first stage, based on prior studies [42,43], we estimated a Logit model that included CAP,
ADV, RD, INTEREST, INTANG, QUICTR, SIZE and ROA as independent variables (year dummy,
and industry dummy included as well); these variables are defined in Table 1. The results of the first
stage indicate that CAP, RD, and SIZE were significant at the 99% level, and the Pseudo-R2 is 0.236.
In the second stage regression, we included the inverse Mills ratio (mean value of mills ratio was 0.305,
and its standard deviation was 0.424) from the first stage in Model (1).
Table 7 shows the results from using Heckman’s two-stage regression model. The results are
robust and similar to our baseline results, which suggests that our main results were not driven by the
endogeneity concern of self-selection bias out of firms conducting FDIs.
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Table 6. Regression test on the relationship between cross-national distance and sustainable tax policies with the FDI sample only.
Dependent Variable as STP
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
ECO POL ADM CUL DEM KNO GEO
Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic
Test variables
MDIS −0.0015 −2.11 ** −0.0039 −2.93 *** −0.0010 −2.53 ** −0.0014 −2.93 *** −0.0014 −2.38 ** −0.0006 −2.43 ** −0.0019 −1.93 *
Control variables
FOREIGN 0.0182 0.11 0.0352 0.21 0.0333 0.19 0.0363 0.21 0.0299 0.18 0.0271 0.16 0.0218 0.13
CASH −1.2654 −3.42 *** −1.2534 −3.39 *** −1.2306 −3.32 *** −1.2228 −3.31 *** −1.2543 −3.39 *** −1.2498 −3.38 *** −1.2523 −3.38 ***
INTANG −3.3991 −3.44 *** −3.3150 −3.37 *** −3.3202 −3.38 *** −3.2398 −3.31 *** −3.4055 −3.46 *** −3.3119 −3.36 *** −3.3114 −3.35 ***
LEV 2.5429 11.56 *** 2.5799 11.70 *** 2.5782 11.69 *** 2.5712 11.67 *** 2.5682 11.66 *** 2.5731 11.67 *** 2.5669 11.65 ***
RD −5.7843 −2.25 ** −5.3094 −2.07 ** −5.2261 −2.04 ** −5.0691 −1.98 ** −5.4617 −2.13 ** −5.1420 −2.00 ** −5.1049 −1.98 **
EQLNE −43.4393 −3.61 *** −41.8385 −3.50 *** −42.1531 −3.52 *** −42.1210 −3.52 *** −42.0899 −3.51 *** −42.3500 −3.54 *** −42.3967 −3.53 ***
NOL 0.8123 5.71 *** 0.8104 5.69 *** 0.8090 5.69 *** 0.8092 5.69 *** 0.8058 5.66 *** 0.8107 5.70 *** 0.8136 5.72 ***
LOSSINT 1.7843 10.03 *** 1.7786 10.00 *** 1.7869 10.05 *** 1.7872 10.05 *** 1.7819 10.02 *** 1.7813 10.02 *** 1.7904 10.07 ***
CFO −11.8795 −12.50 *** −11.9075 −12.55 *** −11.9303 −12.55 *** −11.9374 −12.57 *** −11.9104 −12.53 *** −11.8990 −12.53 *** −11.8516 −12.49 ***
MV 0.6529 4.69 *** 0.6607 4.74 *** 0.6668 4.79 *** 0.6792 4.87 *** 0.6608 4.74 *** 0.6702 4.81 *** 0.6759 4.84 ***
DISC −0.2709 −3.21 *** −0.2589 −3.09 *** −0.2681 −3.20 *** −0.2499 −2.95 *** −0.2687 −3.20 *** −0.2744 −3.29 *** −0.2846 −3.42 ***
THAV 0.0425 0.53 0.0323 0.40 0.0289 0.36 0.0343 0.43 0.0321 0.40 0.0293 0.37 0.0251 0.32
EM 0.6207 6.88 *** 0.6203 6.88 *** 0.6185 6.86 *** 0.6192 6.87 *** 0.6180 6.85 *** 0.6200 6.88 *** 0.6184 6.86 ***
EMP −0.2737 −1.78 * −0.2420 −1.58 −0.2544 −1.65 * −0.2408 −1.57 −0.2626 −1.71 * −0.2712 −1.78 * −0.2946 −1.94 *
4SALE −2.0796 −8.13 *** −2.1034 −8.21 *** −2.0979 −8.18 *** −2.1016 −8.20 *** −2.0909 −8.16 *** −2.1067 −8.21 *** −2.1041 −8.21 ***
INVINT −2.5449 −4.95 *** −2.5845 −5.02 *** −2.5499 −4.96 *** −2.5456 −4.95 *** −2.5632 −4.98 *** −2.5378 −4.93 *** −2.5182 −4.90 ***
TAGG −0.0408 −0.57 −0.0429 −0.60 −0.0424 −0.59 −0.0443 −0.62 −0.0424 −0.59 −0.0431 −0.60 −0.0429 −0.60
Yd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Id Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept −3.3268 −7.93 *** −3.4657 −8.19 *** −3.4837 −8.05 *** −3.5661 −8.19 *** −3.4186 −8.02 *** −3.4540 −8.03 *** −3.4007 −7.82 ***
Pseudo R2 0.2169 0.2175 0.2171 0.2175 0.2170 0.2171 0.2168
No. Obs. 6295 6295 6295 6295 6295 6295 6295
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
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Table 7. Regression test on the relationship between cross-national distance and sustainable tax policies based on the Heckman’s two-stage approaches.
Dependent Variable as STP
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
ECO POL ADM CUL DEM KNO GEO
Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic
Test variables
MDIS −0.0017 −2.29 ** −0.0041 −2.98 *** −0.0010 −2.55 ** −0.0015 −3.02 *** −0.0015 −2.46 ** −0.0006 −2.50 ** −0.0021 −2.08 **
Control variables
FOREIGN 0.0429 0.25 0.0601 0.34 0.0565 0.32 0.0612 0.35 0.0540 0.31 0.0519 0.30 0.0452 0.26
CASH −1.5615 −3.92 *** −1.5434 −3.88 *** −1.5264 −3.82 *** −1.5117 −3.79 *** −1.5510 −3.89 *** −1.5484 −3.88 *** −1.5470 −3.87 ***
INTANG −3.4333 −3.42 *** −3.3378 −3.34 *** −3.3461 −3.36 *** −3.2516 −3.27 *** −3.4390 −3.44 *** −3.3356 −3.33 *** −3.3238 −3.32 ***
LEV 2.3009 9.67 *** 2.3310 9.80 *** 2.3253 9.78 *** 2.3118 9.72 *** 2.3206 9.76 *** 2.3231 9.77 *** 2.3146 9.74 ***
RD −4.4439 −1.71 * −3.9103 −1.50 −3.8572 −1.48 −3.6449 −1.40 −4.0989 −1.58 −3.7606 −1.44 −3.6942 −1.41
EQLNE −43.5555 −3.54 *** −42.0518 −3.44 *** −42.4080 −3.46 *** −42.4238 −3.47 *** −42.2548 −3.45 *** −42.5828 −3.47 *** −42.5565 −3.46 ***
NOL 0.8295 5.73 *** 0.8269 5.71 *** 0.8266 5.71 *** 0.8266 5.71 *** 0.8230 5.68 *** 0.8283 5.72 *** 0.8313 5.74 ***
LOSSINT 1.7823 9.68 *** 1.7685 9.60 *** 1.7818 9.68 *** 1.7808 9.67 *** 1.7776 9.65 *** 1.7765 9.65 *** 1.7868 9.71 ***
CFO −11.1816 −11.43 *** −11.2163 −11.48 *** −11.2323 −11.47 *** −11.2502 −11.50 *** −11.2110 −11.45 *** −11.1970 −11.45 *** −11.1539 −11.41 ***
MV 0.8268 5.00 *** 0.8518 5.13 *** 0.8587 5.16 *** 0.8817 5.27 *** 0.8453 5.09 *** 0.8570 5.15 *** 0.8660 5.16 ***
DISC −0.2534 −2.91 *** −0.2427 −2.81 *** −0.2546 −2.95 *** −0.2336 −2.68 *** −0.2543 −2.94 *** −0.2600 −3.03 *** −0.2691 −3.14 ***
THAV 0.0250 0.30 0.0128 0.16 0.0087 0.11 0.0148 0.18 0.0127 0.16 0.0091 0.11 0.0045 0.05
EM 0.6195 6.68 *** 0.6173 6.65 *** 0.6169 6.65 *** 0.6174 6.65 *** 0.6163 6.64 *** 0.6181 6.66 *** 0.6170 6.65 ***
EMP −0.3538 −2.23 ** −0.3289 −2.08 ** −0.3434 −2.17 ** −0.3270 −2.07 ** −0.3502 −2.21 ** −0.3583 −2.28 ** −0.3800 −2.43 **
4SALE −2.0468 −7.83 *** −2.0724 −7.92 *** −2.0628 −7.88 *** −2.0651 −7.89 *** −2.0569 −7.86 *** −2.0726 −7.91 *** −2.0688 −7.91 ***
INVINT −2.2724 −4.35 *** −2.3035 −4.40 *** −2.2708 −4.34 *** −2.2603 −4.32 *** −2.2912 −4.38 *** −2.2601 −4.32 *** −2.2401 −4.29 ***
TAGG −0.0643 −0.88 −0.0662 −0.90 −0.0653 −0.89 −0.0672 −0.91 −0.0656 −0.89 −0.0663 −0.90 −0.0660 −0.90
Mills ratio 0.2512 1.79 * 0.2722 1.93 * 0.2635 1.88 * 0.2638 1.88 * 0.2641 1.88 * 0.2826 2.01 ** 0.2632 1.87 *
Yd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Id Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept −3.9194 −6.33 *** −4.1385 −6.58 *** −4.1503 −6.45 *** −4.3017 −6.64 *** −4.0473 −6.41 *** −4.0989 −6.43 *** −4.0668 −6.24 ***
Pseudo R2 0.2130 0.2136 0.2132 0.2136 0.2131 0.2132 0.2129
No. Obs. 5850 5850 5850 5850 5850 5850 5850
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
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5. Further Analysis
5.1. FDI in Tax Haven Countries
The role of tax haven countries investment is discussed by prior studies. Desai et al. [44]
investigated the relation between tax havens and firm behavior and reported that firms avoid foreign
and domestic tax liabilities by engaging tax haven activities. Harris et al. [45] found that American
firms with tax haven subsidiaries took relatively lower tax liabilities. These findings implicated that
tax havens provide opportunities for tax avoidance by multinational firms. In this section, we further
discuss the effect of tax avoidance incentive on the results.
FDI in tax haven countries may be substitutes in terms of factors contributing to increased tax
avoidance incentive (i.e., increased book-tax difference). To some extent, if the FDI in tax haven
countries and FDI in long multinational countries are substitutes, then the role played by FDI in
long cross-national distance between the home and host countries in threatening the sustainability of
tax policies may be less pronounced in the case of FDI in tax haven countries. To examine whether
tax haven affects the results, we further analyzed the coefficient of ECO × THAV, POL × THAV,
ADM × THAV, CUL × THAV, DEM × THAV, KNO × THAV, and GEO × THAV. We expected a positive
association between each interaction.
Table 8 presents regression results on the incentive interaction variables. The coefficients of all
seven interactions were positive and significant. These results predict that FDI in tax haven countries
negatively moderated the relationship between cross-national distances (from the economic, political,
administrative, cultural, demographic, knowledge, and geographical perspectives) and sustainable
tax policies.
5.2. Meeting Earnings Benchmark
Prior literature provides evidence on the relation between earnings management and tax incentives.
Guenther [46] found the reduction of tax rate had a negative effect on the current accruals of next period.
Dhaliwal et al. [47] asserted that firms can manage earnings by changing effective tax rates because
tax expense affects final reported earnings. Badertscher et al. [48] found that earnings management
had an effect on book-tax difference, and the direction of the relation was related to the firm-specific
characteristics. Beuselinck. and Deloof [49] argued that group firms were more likely to manage
earnings to achieve taxation purposes (i.e., marginal tax rate). In this section, considering the relation
between tax planning and earnings management, we further discuss the effect of meeting an earnings
benchmark on the results.
Unlike in the case of FDI in tax haven countries, meeting an earnings benchmark may appear
not only in international but also domestic business. Meeting an earnings benchmark may not be
a substitute for risk arising from FDI. If so, then the effects of FDI in long cross-national distance host
country with respect to increasing risk (i.e., less sustainable tax policies) may be greater when firms
meet earnings benchmark. To examine whether meeting earnings benchmark affected the results,
we further analyzed the coefficient of ECO × EM, POL × EM, ADM × EM, CUL × EM, DEM × EM,
KNO × EM, and GEO × EM. We expected a negative association between each interaction.
Table 9 presents regression results on the incentive interaction variables. The coefficients of all
seven interactions were negative and significant. These results predicted that meeting an earnings
benchmark positively moderated the relationship between cross-national distances (from the economic,
political, administrative, cultural, demographic, knowledge, and geographical perspectives) and
sustainability of tax policies.
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Table 8. Tax avoidance incentive effect on the relationship between cross-national distance and sustainable tax policies.
Dependent Variable as STP
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
ECO POL ADM CUL DEM KNO GEO
Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic
Test variables
MDIS −0.0021 −3.15 *** −0.0051 −3.85 *** −0.0012 −3.16 *** −0.0017 −3.63 *** −0.0017 −2.97 *** −0.0008 −3.03 *** −0.0023 −2.35 **
MDIS × THAV 0.0042 2.89 *** 0.0050 2.33 ** 0.0014 2.36 ** 0.0016 2.20 ** 0.0019 1.94 * 0.0009 2.21 ** 0.0028 1.86 *
Control variables
FOREIGN −0.0702 −0.47 −0.0592 −0.39 −0.0552 −0.37 −0.0522 −0.35 −0.0555 −0.37 −0.0580 −0.39 −0.0635 −0.42
CASH −2.0747 −7.26 *** −2.0644 −7.24 *** −2.0647 −7.22 *** −2.0519 −7.19 *** −2.0701 −7.25 *** −2.0740 −7.26 *** −2.0781 −7.27 ***
INTANG −4.4693 −4.79 *** −4.3905 −4.74 *** −4.3571 −4.70 *** −4.3211 −4.67 *** −4.4609 −4.80 *** −4.3958 −4.74 *** −4.4160 −4.75 ***
LEV 1.9627 11.56 *** 1.9888 11.71 *** 1.9825 11.67 *** 1.9746 11.63 *** 1.9783 11.65 *** 1.9771 11.64 *** 1.9799 11.66 ***
RD −6.1340 −2.70 *** −5.6469 −2.49 ** −5.6448 −2.49 ** −5.5331 −2.44 ** −5.8438 −2.58 ** −5.6369 −2.48 ** −5.6388 −2.48 **
EQLNE −38.9451 −3.88 *** −37.2268 −3.74 *** −37.5061 −3.76 *** −37.3582 −3.75 *** −37.3067 −3.74 *** −37.4855 −3.76 *** −37.6175 −3.76 ***
NOL 0.8191 7.07 *** 0.8247 7.11 *** 0.8217 7.10 *** 0.8224 7.10 *** 0.8178 7.06 *** 0.8199 7.08 *** 0.8233 7.11 ***
LOSSINT 1.4660 10.46 *** 1.4648 10.46 *** 1.4694 10.49 *** 1.4722 10.50 *** 1.4685 10.48 *** 1.4686 10.49 *** 1.4703 10.49 ***
CFO −7.9999 −11.34 *** −7.9957 −11.35 *** −7.9887 −11.34 *** −8.0052 −11.36 *** −7.9936 −11.34 *** −7.9837 −11.33 *** −7.9431 −11.28 ***
MV 0.6363 6.18 *** 0.6395 6.21 *** 0.6428 6.24 *** 0.6482 6.29 *** 0.6390 6.21 *** 0.6430 6.24 *** 0.6460 6.27 ***
DISC −0.2863 −3.87 *** −0.2704 −3.69 *** −0.2889 −3.94 *** −0.2651 −3.56 *** −0.2889 −3.91 *** −0.2964 −4.07 *** −0.3151 −4.35 ***
THAV −0.3084 −2.32 ** −0.1772 −1.67 * −0.1800 −1.73 * −0.1778 −1.61 −0.1624 −1.48 −0.1561 −1.57 −0.1337 −1.37
EM 0.5967 8.26 *** 0.5953 8.25 *** 0.5935 8.22 *** 0.5947 8.24 *** 0.5930 8.22 *** 0.5937 8.23 *** 0.5920 8.20 ***
EMP −0.2925 −2.60 *** −0.2585 −2.30 ** −0.2814 −2.50 ** −0.2620 −2.33 ** −0.2820 −2.51 ** −0.2872 −2.57 ** −0.3068 −2.75 ***
4SALE −1.5605 −7.79 *** −1.5762 −7.86 *** −1.5709 −7.84 *** −1.5748 −7.86 *** −1.5677 −7.83 *** −1.5788 −7.87 *** −1.5768 −7.87 ***
INVINT −2.9170 −8.41 *** −2.9339 −8.45 *** −2.9152 −8.40 *** −2.9084 −8.38 *** −2.9154 −8.41 *** −2.9117 −8.39 *** −2.9059 −8.38 ***
TAGG 0.0363 0.63 0.0349 0.60 0.0348 0.60 0.0337 0.58 0.0340 0.59 0.0340 0.59 0.0336 0.58
Yd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Id Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept −2.5342 −7.83 *** −2.6560 −8.16 *** −2.6148 −7.92 *** −2.6853 −8.1 *** −2.5917 −7.92 *** −2.5996 −7.91 *** −2.5525 −7.71 ***
Pseudo R2 0.2117 0.2119 0.2115 0.2117 0.2113 0.2114 0.2110
No. Obs. 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
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Table 9. Meeting earnings benchmark effect on the relationship between cross-national distance and sustainable tax policies.
Dependent Variable as STP
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
ECO POL ADM CUL DEM KNO GEO
Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic
Test variables
MDIS −0.0009 −1.39 −0.0026 −2.17 ** −0.0005 −1.53 −0.0009 −2.07 ** −0.0008 −1.42 −0.0003 −1.38 −0.0008 −0.93
MDIS × EM −0.0043 −3.44 *** −0.0085 −3.51 *** −0.0025 −3.60 *** −0.0030 −3.78 *** −0.0048 −4.23 *** −0.0017 −3.55 *** −0.0062 −3.28 ***
Control variables
FOREIGN −0.0400 −0.27 −0.0244 −0.16 −0.0256 −0.17 −0.0218 −0.15 −0.0230 −0.15 −0.0331 −0.22 −0.0402 −0.27
CASH −2.0630 −7.22 *** −2.0762 −7.27 *** −2.0572 −7.19 *** −2.0506 −7.18 *** −2.0703 −7.24 *** −2.0747 −7.26 *** −2.0720 −7.24 ***
INTANG −4.4366 −4.78 *** −4.3037 −4.63 *** −4.3601 −4.69 *** −4.2555 −4.58 *** −4.4228 −4.76 *** −4.3568 −4.67 *** −4.3633 −4.66 ***
LEV 1.9728 11.62 *** 1.9866 11.69 *** 1.9917 11.72 *** 1.9831 11.68 *** 1.9848 11.69 *** 1.9878 11.70 *** 1.9923 11.73 ***
RD −5.9119 −2.61 *** −5.4779 −2.43 ** −5.4937 −2.44 ** −5.3384 −2.37 ** −5.7158 −2.53 ** −5.3981 −2.39 ** −5.3721 −2.37 **
EQLNE −37.6464 −3.78 *** −36.3029 −3.66 *** −36.6995 −3.70 *** −36.5508 −3.69 *** −36.7049 −3.70 *** −36.9458 −3.71 *** −37.0425 −3.72 ***
NOL 0.8169 7.06 *** 0.8148 7.05 *** 0.8154 7.05 *** 0.8154 7.06 *** 0.8145 7.05 *** 0.8166 7.06 *** 0.8161 7.06 ***
LOSSINT 1.4771 10.54 *** 1.4761 10.54 *** 1.4782 10.55 *** 1.4799 10.56 *** 1.4765 10.54 *** 1.4752 10.54 *** 1.4763 10.54 ***
CFO −8.0041 −11.36 *** −7.9988 −11.36 *** −8.0135 −11.37 *** −8.0308 −11.40 *** −8.0232 −11.38 *** −7.9924 −11.35 *** −7.9750 −11.33 ***
MV 0.6394 6.22 *** 0.6474 6.29 *** 0.6498 6.31 *** 0.6560 6.37 *** 0.6439 6.25 *** 0.6504 6.32 *** 0.6528 6.33 ***
DISC −0.2990 −4.06 *** −0.2819 −3.87 *** −0.2978 −4.10 *** −0.2746 −3.72 *** −0.2915 −3.98 *** −0.3078 −4.27 *** −0.3187 −4.43 ***
THAV −0.0016 −0.02 −0.0096 −0.13 −0.0148 −0.20 −0.0070 −0.09 −0.0101 −0.14 −0.0165 −0.22 −0.0218 −0.29
EM 0.7716 8.71 *** 0.7692 8.79 *** 0.7680 8.85 *** 0.7977 8.89 *** 0.8236 9.15 *** 0.7602 8.88 *** 0.7426 8.72 ***
EMP −0.2825 −2.52 ** −0.2661 −2.37 ** −0.2799 −2.49 ** −0.2627 −2.34 ** −0.2745 −2.45 ** −0.2908 −2.60 *** −0.3071 −2.76 ***
4SALE −1.5824 −7.91 *** −1.5966 −7.97 *** −1.5929 −7.96 *** −1.5966 −7.98 *** −1.5924 −7.96 *** −1.5957 −7.97 *** −1.5937 −7.96 ***
INVINT −2.9236 −8.42 *** −2.9236 −8.41 *** −2.9197 −8.40 *** −2.9108 −8.37 *** −2.9230 −8.41 *** −2.9114 −8.38 *** −2.9144 −8.39 ***
TAGG 0.0318 0.55 0.0321 0.55 0.0327 0.56 0.0318 0.55 0.0330 0.57 0.0313 0.54 0.0326 0.56
Yd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Id Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept −2.6258 −8.11 *** −2.7055 −8.30 *** −2.6952 −8.15 *** −2.7677 −8.34 *** −2.6849 −8.19 *** −2.6688 −8.11 *** −2.6210 −7.91 ***
Pseudo R2 0.2121 0.2126 0.2122 0.2127 0.2127 0.2122 0.2118
No. Obs. 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
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5.3. Foreign Ownership
In the taxation research, ownership structure is also an important part [50]. Ownership patterns can
have an important effect on tax avoidance, which is demonstrated by several researchers [9,36,39,51,52].
In this section, we focus on the foreign firm ownership, because foreign firm ownership is highly
relative to FDI practice [53,54].
Douma et al. [55] suggested that foreign shareholders were more likely to perform an effective
monitoring role and found a foreign corporate ownership positively affected firm performance (i.e., high
ROA and Q ratio. Where ROA = operating earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes/assets;
Q ratio = (market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets). In addition, prior
studies proved that firms with a high level of foreign ownership were positively associated with the
degree of collaboration, knowledge transfer, and resource sharing [56–59]. Along with the empirical
findings that there exists a positive relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance,
we consider this shareholder characteristic (i.e., high proportion of foreign ownership) may have
a negative moderate effect on the relationship between long cross-national distance and sustainable
tax policies. Therefore, we further analyzed the coefficient of ECO × FOREIGN, POL × FOREIGN,
ADM × FOREIGN, CUL × FOREIGN, DEM × FOREIGN, KNO × FOREIGN, and GEO × FOREIGN.
We expected a positive association between each interaction.
Table 10 presents regression results on the incentive interaction variables. The coefficients of
ECO × FOREIGN, ADM× FOREIGN, and DEM× FOREIGN were positive and significant. These results
predict that foreign ownership negatively moderate the relationship between cross-national distances
(from the economic, administrative, and demographic perspectives) and sustainable tax policies.
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Table 10. Foreigner investors’ interests effect on the relationship between cross-national distance and sustainable tax policies.
Dependent Variable as STP
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
ECO POL ADM CUL DEM KNO GEO
Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic Coef. Z-Statistic
Test variables
MDIS −0.0018 −2.75 *** −0.0042 −3.46 *** −0.0010 −2.83 *** −0.0014 −3.31 *** −0.0015 −2.79 *** −0.0006 −2.55 ** −0.0018 −1.99 **
MDIS ×
FOREIGN 0.0033 1.79 * 0.0045 1.45 0.0014 1.75 * 0.0014 1.42 0.0022 1.68 * 0.0005 0.94 0.0020 1.00
Control variables
FOREIGN −0.3121 −1.47 −0.2297 −1.14 −0.2538 −1.31 −0.2303 −1.14 −0.2604 −1.32 −0.1545 −0.83 −0.1643 −0.89
CASH −2.0639 −7.23 *** −2.0531 −7.20 *** −2.0400 −7.14 *** −2.0342 −7.13 *** −2.0499 −7.18 *** −2.0572 −7.21 *** −2.0571 −7.20 ***
INTANG −4.5261 −4.88 *** −4.4084 −4.76 *** −4.4160 −4.77 *** −4.3394 −4.69 *** −4.4907 −4.85 *** −4.4301 −4.77 *** −4.4449 −4.78 ***
LEV 1.9720 11.62 *** 1.9941 11.74 *** 1.9947 11.75 *** 1.9854 11.70 *** 1.9874 11.71 *** 1.9921 11.74 *** 1.9915 11.74 ***
RD −5.9691 −2.64 *** −5.5600 −2.46 ** −5.5584 −2.46 ** −5.4035 −2.39 ** −5.7300 −2.53 ** −5.4587 −2.41 ** −5.4645 −2.41 **
EQLNE −37.4549 −3.74 *** −36.3572 −3.66 *** −36.4827 −3.66 *** −36.4160 −3.66 *** −36.6020 −3.67 *** −36.8859 −3.70 *** −36.9514 −3.70 ***
NOL 0.8185 7.06 *** 0.8190 7.07 *** 0.8185 7.07 *** 0.8187 7.07 *** 0.8164 7.05 *** 0.8185 7.07 *** 0.8200 7.08 ***
LOSSINT 1.4849 10.58 *** 1.4785 10.55 *** 1.4843 10.58 *** 1.4863 10.59 *** 1.4801 10.55 *** 1.4778 10.55 *** 1.4823 10.57 ***
CFO −7.9952 −11.34 *** −8.0040 −11.37 *** −8.0080 −11.36 *** −8.0178 −11.38 *** −8.0066 −11.36 *** −7.9903 −11.35 *** −7.9615 −11.31 ***
MV 0.6357 6.18 *** 0.6432 6.25 *** 0.6442 6.26 *** 0.6519 6.33 *** 0.6389 6.21 *** 0.6464 6.28 *** 0.6492 6.31 ***
DISC −0.3008 −4.08 *** −0.2876 −3.95 *** −0.3029 −4.16 *** −0.2802 −3.79 *** −0.2999 −4.09 *** −0.3132 −4.34 *** −0.3264 −4.53 ***
THAV 0.0083 0.11 −0.0044 −0.06 −0.0083 −0.11 −0.0001 0.00 −0.0033 −0.04 −0.0110 −0.15 −0.0168 −0.23
EM 0.5899 8.17 *** 0.5907 8.18 *** 0.5892 8.16 *** 0.5903 8.18 *** 0.5888 8.16 *** 0.5909 8.19 *** 0.5893 8.17 ***
EMP −0.2859 −2.55 ** −0.2665 −2.38 ** −0.2807 −2.50 ** −0.2654 −2.36 ** −0.2802 −2.50 ** −0.2919 −2.61 *** −0.3089 −2.78 ***
4SALE −1.5623 −7.80 *** −1.5815 −7.89 *** −1.5749 −7.86 *** −1.5785 −7.87 *** −1.5702 −7.84 *** −1.5856 −7.90 *** −1.5801 −7.89 ***
INVINT −2.9274 −8.44 *** −2.9298 −8.44 *** −2.9136 −8.40 *** −2.9070 −8.38 *** −2.9185 −8.41 *** −2.9100 −8.39 *** −2.9058 −8.38 ***
TAGG 0.0302 0.52 0.0302 0.52 0.0296 0.51 0.0290 0.50 0.0293 0.51 0.0296 0.51 0.0298 0.51
Yd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Id Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept −2.5649 −7.94 *** −2.6648 −8.19 *** −2.6453 −8.02 *** −2.7144 −8.20 *** −2.6148 −8.00 *** −2.6257 −8.00 *** −2.5832 −7.81 ***
Pseudo R2 0.2113 0.2116 0.2113 0.2115 0.2112 0.2110 0.2108
No. Obs. 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
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6. Conclusions and Discussion
The tax issue of international business in multinationals has attracted increasing attention from
academics, tax policy makers, government, and corporations. In this study, we try to investigate
whether and how cross-national distances of FDI affect sustainability of tax policies using the FDI data
in Japan. We measure cross-national distances based on the Mahalanobis method from the economic,
political, administrative, cultural, demographic, knowledge, and geographical perspectives.
Using a unique data source from the OJC database, we obtained foreign investment details of all
listed firms in Japan. We predicted and found that longer cross-national distances led to less likelihood
of the adoption for sustainable tax policies. This relation was significant in both statistical and economic
senses. We further employed the Heckman method to mitigate the potential sample selection bias and
the findings remained the same. In additional analysis, we found the above relation was weakened
when firms invest in tax haven countries or have a high proportion of foreign investor ownership,
while it was strengthened when firms met an earnings benchmark. These results suggest the one
risk of increasing cross-national distance between host country and home country is less sustainable
tax policies.
Comparing with existing studies, this study has several contributions. First, it is one of the
few, if not the first, research to provide detailed empirical evidence on the relationship between
cross-national distances and sustainability of tax policies with a sample of Japanese listed firms.
This study extends the book-tax difference studies [1–7,20,22,25,26] and cross-national distance
studies [11,12,27,28] by providing evidence that multidimensional cross-national distance dimensions
may lead to a negative effect on the sustainability of tax policies. Second, the dimensions of cross-national
distance of FDI (i.e., perspectives from economic, political, administrative, cultural, demographic,
knowledge, and geographical distance) and the indicator variable of sustainable tax policies provide
a methodological contribution on enriching both international business and environmental studies
of country characteristics and business sustainability. Third, this study adds to the literature on tax
avoidance, earnings management, and corporate governance [44,45,47–49,53–59]. It extends these
areas by showing that the relation between cross-national distances and sustainable tax policies can
be positively moderated by meeting an earnings benchmark and negatively moderated by tax haven
country investment and foreign investors’ interests, respectively.
Our study has implications for the business practice. Given the concern of the complicated tax
issues of multinational firms, the findings may help policy makers to improve tax policy. Specifically,
policy makers may improve firms’ likelihood of the adoption for sustainable tax policies by adding or
refining the rules on the issue of cross-national distance of FDI. Also, this study’s evidence may be useful
to managers, investors, shareholders, or others interested in measuring the business sustainability as it
suggests that the cross-national distances between FDI host country and home country are important
factors that affect the likelihood of the adoption for sustainable tax policies.
This study has its limitations. As discussed in former sections, we define that sustainable tax
policies focus on maintaining less difference between book income and taxable income over time.
Sustainable tax policy refers to the case where the firm has a low level of BTAX as well as a low level of
standard deviation of BTAX for the three-year period. There exist some alternative definitions of the
sustainable tax policies [60–62] that are not tested in this study. In addition, we could not eliminate the
possibility that other host country characteristics [63–66] influenced the likelihood of the adoption for
sustainable tax policies. It will be helpful to investigate other types of country characteristics and how
they affect business activities.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Dimension of cross-national distances.
Dimension Component Variables Source Years Available # of Countries
Literature *
[11] [12] [27] [28]
Administrative Distance (ADM) # # × 4
Colonizer-colonized link Whether dyad shares a colonial tie CIA Factbook constant 198
Common language % population that speak the same language in the dyad CIA Factbook constant 198
Common religion % population that share the same religion in the dyad CIA Factbook constant 198
Legal system Whether dyad shares the same legal system La Porta et al. [13] constant 198
Cultural Distance (CUL) # # × ×
Power distance The degree to which the members accept that power is distributed unequally Hofstede et al. [14] constant 102
Individualism Individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families Hofstede et al. [14] constant 102
Masculinity A preference for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material rewards for success Hofstede et al. [14] constant 102
Uncertainty avoidance The degree to which the members feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity Hofstede et al. [14] constant 102
Long term orientation The connection of the past with the current and future actions or challenges Hofstede et al. [14] constant 86
Indulgence A society that allows relatively free gratification of basic Hofstede et al. [14] constant 81
Demographic Distance (DEM) # # × ×
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, total (years) WDI 2004–2014 249
Birth rate Birth rate, crude (per 1000 people) WDI 2004–2014 256
Population under 14 Population ages 0–14 (% of total) WDI 2004–2014 240
Population under 65 Population ages 65 and above (% of total) WDI 2004–2014 240
Economic Distance (ECO) # # # ×
Income GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) WDI 2004–2014 249
Inflation GDP deflator (base year varies by country) WDI 2004–2014 205
Exports Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI 2004–2014 242
Imports Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI 2004–2014 242
Geographic Distance (GEO) # # × ×
Grate circle distance Distance between two countries according to the geographic center of the countries CIA Factbook constant 196
Knowledge Distance (KNO) # # × ×
Patents Number of patents per one million population WDI and USPTO 2004–2014 171
Scientific articles Number of scientific articles per one million population WDI and SJR 2004–2014 210
Political Distance (POL) # # × 4
Political stability Measured by considering independent institutional actors with veto power POLCON 2004–2014 187
Size of the state General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) WDI 2004–2014 233
WTO member Membership in WTO (GATT before 1993) WTO 2004–2015 163
Regional trade agreement Number of RTAs in force WTO 2004–2015 213
* “#”, “4”, and “×” indicate same variables, similar variables, and no used variables, respectively.
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